
High-security & interoperable OAuth 2: What's the latest?







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Authlete

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In this Masterclass

Why is OAuth 2.0 alone insufficient for high-security and interoperable applications?

What is FAPI?

FAPI 2.0 Deep-Dive

Current Status & Adoption



e-health open banking e-signing open finance eopen consumer government data digital identity ecosystems

Requirements for high-security & interoperable OAuth 2



Highest Levels of Security

Security/ Hardening

OAuth Security Best Current Practice (IETF draft)

Learnings from practice & research:

- Protect against access token misuse, mix-up attacks, and more
- Avoid insecure options
- Two layers of defense

But: 49 pages, 68 MUSTs and MUST NOTs, > 50 other requirements and recommendations



OAuth 2.1 to the Rescue?

Security/ Hardening

OAuth 2.1 ≈ OAuth 2.0 + Security BCP

But:

- General-purpose profile, does not enforce high-security options
- Not an interoperability profile



Not Interoperable by Default

OAuth 2.x optionality

- grant types
- authentication methods
- security mechanisms
- cryptographic algorithms
- ...

Bespoke solutions for common problems

- How to ask for complex consents?
- How to manage existing grants?
- How to achieve non-repudiation?



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Interoperability

Does Everyone Follow the Rules?


(Only) testing ensures that a large-scale ecosystem actually works.

OpenID Connect has conformance tests.

But what about OAuth?

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Conformance Tests



What is FAPI?



Financial API



Financial API Financial API Security Profile



Financial API Financial API Security Profile Financial-grade API Security Profile



Financial API Financial API Security Profile Financial-grade API Security Profile FAPI Security Profile



FAPI!

Security, interoperability, and feature profile for OAuth 2.0


Usable for all high-security APIs:


- e-Signing
- e-Government
- Health
- ...


FAPI 2.0 — Evolution of FAPI 1.0 based on industry experience:


- Improved security
- Improved interoperability
- Simplified development















Interoperable special- purpose profiles (optional)	Message Signing	Client-Initiated Backchannel Authentication (CIBA)	Grant Management
Means to implement secure & interoperable OAuth & OIDC		Handling grants and consent. Consent synchronization, grant revocation,	
Security Requirements		expanding existing grants	5,

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FAPI 2.0 Deep-Dive

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OAuth Security Best Current Practice RFC Protect against redirect URIs manipulation, mix-up attacks, etc. incorporated. **Disallow less secure options** Avoid potential security issues (e.g., implicit grant) **Pushed Authorization Requests** Ensure confidentiality and integrity of to protect authorization request data authorization request. Prevent misuse of stolen tokens, Sender-constrained access tokens via QAuth Mutual TLS or OAuth DPoP. provide defense-in-depth.

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Security/

Hardening

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
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Security/

Hardening


Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)

Traditional OAuth 2.x:



Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)


With Pushed Authorization Requests (RFC9126):



OAuth Security Best Current Practice RFC Protect against redirect URIs manipulation, mix-up attacks, etc. incorporated. **Disallow less secure options** Avoid potential security issues (e.g., implicit grant) **Pushed Authorization Requests** Ensure confidentiality and integrity of to protect authorization request data authorization request. Sender-constrained access tokens Prevent misuse of stolen tokens, via QAuth Mutual TLS or OAuth DPoP. provide defense-in-depth. ntiverse


Security/ Hardening

Sender-Constrained Access Tokens



Sender-Constrained Access Tokens

What if the access token leaks?



Choose Your Flavor

DPoP

Application layer

Headers w/ signature over request URI

JWK key pairs

Can be used for web app clients

No integration on network layer needed

Mutual TLS (MTLS)

Network layer

TLS client authentication

X.509 certificates (can be self-signed)

Request fully protected

Can be used for client authentication

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Security/ Hardening

Asymmetric client authentication instead of client secrets.

Robust client authentication.

High-security cryptographic algorithms, TLS recommendations, ...

Secure encryption, signing, and well-protected network layer.

Require use of PKCE

Protect authorization codes even when stolen.



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Security/

Hardening

Security/ Hardening

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OAuth client created

The client ID and secret can always be accessed from Credentials in APIs & Services

0

OAuth is limited to 100 <u>sensitive scope logins</u> I until the <u>OAuth</u> <u>consent screen</u> is verified. This may require a verification process that can take several days.

Client ID 761386692405k7gqt5ueqcjofsrp5ast3l2fkbqhqil1.apps.g oogleusercontent.com

GOCSPX-

Enabled

IDAqKg_Qn5xNcwrJkiX7mv7cidt9

17 May 2023 at 20:56:58 GMT+1

Client secret

Creation date

Status


▲ DOWNLOAD JSON





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Client Authentication: client_secret_post



Client Authentication: Choose Your Flavor

private_key_jwt

Application layer

Signed JWT

JWK key pairs

Can be used for web app clients

No integration on network layer needed

Mutual TLS (MTLS)

Network layer

TLS client authentication

X.509 certificates (can be self-signed)

Request fully protected


Can be used for client authentication

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✓ Client authentication				
sandbox.yes.com:8d0825d8-c445-4d13-8bb0-a0d8686c1def_jwks.json 💿 🖺				
Thumbprint \$	Key ID \$	Common		
ACD864B7EABB05185F776AC1DDBA57D290A5CF21C9D13930A395754DF6CCA7BA	15344084215054130153	OIDF eK		
Self-Signed Client Certificate For mutual TLS we need a self-signed certificate from you. You may provide it in PEM format or as a JWKS or a members of the JWK according to Sec 4.7 of RFC 7517. Please copy and paste the contents of your self-signed				
Upload File Trop file here Add certificate				



Client Authentication: private_key_jwt





FAPI 2.0: Security Hardening

Security/ Hardening

Asymmetric client authentication instead of client secrets.	Robust client authentication.	
High-security cryptographic algorithms, TLS recommendations, …	Secure encryption, signing, and well-protected network layer.	
Require use of PKCE	Protect authorization codes even when stolen.	



Security: We Didn't Wing It!

Security/ Hardening

Formal protocol security analysis

by University of Stuttgart, Germany researchers to protect against flaws in the protocol.

 \rightarrow Well-understood security properties based on **attacker model**.



FAPI 2.0: Interoperability

Interoperability

Reduced protocol options Ensure on-the-wire interoperability.

Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)

Replace bespoke solutions like *authorization resources*, ensure interoperability and security, minimize data in front-channel.



FAPI 2.0: Conformance Tests

Conformance Tests

In-depth conformance testing

Facilitate interoperability in large-scale ecosystems

Official OpenID Foundation certification program

Ensure compatibility of software & solutions



Current Status & Adoption[•]

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Is FAPI 2.0 ready to use?


Yes!

All specifications have reached "implementer's draft"

- Stable numbered version of the specification
- Implementer's drafts are never changed
- IPR protection

FAPI 2.0 Security Profile "Final" due around end of 2023





FAPI 2.0 Everywhere?

FAPI 2.0 is a shortcut towards state-of-the-art security & interoperability for all kinds of APIs.

Only for short-lived tokens in lower-security applications, FAPI 2.0 might be too much.



High-security & interoperable OAuth 2?

FAPI 2.0 is the 'batteries included' spec for high-security ecosystems:

- Latest security recommendations
- · On-the-wire interoperability
- Comprehensive conformance testing
- Feature-rich extensions
- Growing world-wide adoption



THANK YOU! Questions?

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